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1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the case for an efficiency test in competition and 
regulatory policy, particularly in the context of the geographic isolation, small size and 
openness of the New Zealand economy. The efficiency test requires implementing a cost-
benefit analysis of the relevant transaction, practice or regulatory restriction. Following 
enjoinment by the High Court1 for it to use empirical evidence and Ministerial requests 
for evaluation of regulatory actions, the Commerce Commission has conducted a number 
of quantitative cost-benefit studies. The various approaches of these studies make it 
timely to consider whether, and if so how, cost-benefit analyses should be implemented 
in principle and under New Zealand competition law statutes. 2
 
Competition and regulatory policy is encapsulated in the  Commerce Act 1986 and its 
amendments, the Telelcommunications Act 2001, and the Dairy Industry Restructuring 
Act 2001. 3 The economic precepts underlying the Commerce Act 1986 were in substance 
taken from the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974, which in turn drew heavily (but not 
exclusively) on United States anti-trust law.  However the United States is an economy of 
some 300 million people. In contrast, New Zealand has an economy of  4 million people, 
roughly the population of Sydney. Are concepts developed in the context of a large 
economy such as that of the United States, or even Australia, applicable without 
modification in a small isolated economy such as New Zealand?  Certain country-specific 
characteristics – for example, population and geographic isolation - are exogenous to the 
operation of competition law and regulation. However others such as market structure 
and firm performance are much less so, being moulded to a degree by these legal 
constraints as well as by the country’s given features and openess to trade; itself a policy 
choice. Relative to these larger economies and many other developed economies the New 
                                                 
1    Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Limited v Commerce Commission (1991) 4 TCLR; 446.  
2    These include the Commission’s Determinations regarding a proposed arrangement between Air 
New Zealand and Qantas (Commerce Commission Decision 511 (2003)) and joint marketing of Pohokura 
gas (Commerce Commission Decision 505 (2003)), and gas pipeline (Commerce Commission Section 56 
Gas Control Inquiry: Final Report (2004)) and unbundling enquiries. 
3  The term Commerce Act shall be used for the Commerce Act 1986 and its subsequent  
amendments.  
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Zealand economy generally has very high industry concentration, high capital intensity 
across many industries, high total cost to revenue (with smaller firms having a relatively 
higher ratio than larger firms); and significant lack of benefits of scale. 4
 
New Zealand’s small, geographically isolated economy renders foreign markets of  direct 
relevance to its own markets' performance. The effects of distance on trade and of the 
interaction of distance and border factors on an economy’s performance are difficult to 
assess, and yet they are important in establishing what might be expected of internal and 
external trade of an isolated economy.  The vigour of international trade affects the extent 
of competition in domestic markets; even their definition. Because of transaction costs 
and arguable networking dislocations implied by geographic isolation, New Zealand has 
a separation of its domestic market from other markets to an extent not experienced by 
many other countries.5 Despite the breadth of the Tasman Sea, open access to the markets 
of its relatively large near neighbour, Australia, is extremely important for New Zealand 
trade per se, and for the competition it poses for the New Zealand domestic market. The 
openness of the economy is important for the opportunities it presents industries for 
procurement and for export, and domestic competition. A growing body of literature 
concludes that open trade and investment policies are relatively much more important 
than competition law for market and firm performance in small countries.6 For those 
countries whose location is such that their (domestic) markets coincide geographically 
with those markets of larger economies were it not for trade and other institutional 
restrictions that relate to national sovereignty, close harmonisation of all aspects of 
competition law would seem appropriate, particularly if barriers to trade were low. 
Indeed, in the absence of such barriers economies of scale and scope will be enhanced by 
low-cost exporting as will market discipline effects of imports. The small economy 
problem may not apply for countries geographically and institutionally close to much 
                                                 
4   The issues and quantification of the New Zealand economy’s small size, geographic isolation and 
openness are discussed in Ratnayake (1999), Arnold, Boles de Boer, and Evans (2003), and Evans and 
Hughes (2003).  
5   Although, in regard to the United States, Krishna (2003) finds no correlation between trade and 
welfare arising from either distance or income relating to any of the United States’ trading partners, this is 
unlikely to be applicable to an isolated economy such as that of New Zealand. 
6   See for example, Levisohn (1993) and Hoekman, Kee and Olarreaga (2001), and Trebilcock 
(1991, and 2004). For a skeptical view of the evidence see Baldwin (2000). 
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larger economies, no matter how small the economy.  A small European country might 
efficiently harmonise its law closely with the competition law of large neighbours (and 
ultimately even be embedded in the European Union) whereas New Zealand and 
Australia face some disjunction between their domestic and export markets due to costs 
associated with distance. For Australasia close harmonisation of law with other countries 
or more restrictive competition law may be less efficient. 
 
What is meant by efficiencies and its link with cost-benefit analysis are considered in the 
next section. The application of competition law in New Zealand is discussed in Section 
3. Although competition law is different from price regulation in that a) it relies on 
sanction by Courts rather than the dictates of appointed officials, and b) price regulation 
is predominantly applied to infrastructure (nontradable goods for which the size and 
isolation of the economy may have less import), the principles relating to efficiencies and 
market performance are the same. The extension to regulation is mentioned in this 
section. In Section 4 the case for an efficiencies defence is reviewed.   
 
2 The Efficiency Defence and Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
Competition law has the purpose of regulating commercial conduct in the sector of the 
economy for which there is competition and de-centralised production and consumption 
decisions.  It affects the balance of co-operation and competition among commercial 
firms and limits their practices. Particularly in small economies, there is a trade-off 
between numbers of firms and economies of scale that competition policies should 
reflect. The tension between scale and numbers of firms is aggravated by geographic 
isolation.  
 
Firms evolve in all sorts of ways: via competition in the product and ownership markets 
and by arrangements with other firms seeking to attain improvements in productive 
efficiency and scale.  In small economies, however, the extent to which such efficiencies 
can be achieved may be limited by the size of the domestic market, thereby limiting 
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economies of scale and scope7, and raising transaction costs in which there are savings 
associated with specialisation that attends larger market sizes.8 The alternative for 
tradable goods and services in small economies is to expand by exporting.  Caves, Porter 
and Spence (1980) argue that the small country handicap is manifest in sources of 
economic performance.9   
 
Economic performance can be divided into two broad categories. Firstly, allocative 
efficiency is static or timeless in that it typically does not incorporate the process of 
investment and innovation, nor the concomitant management of risk. It is measured by 
total economic surplus at points in time.10 It includes intra-firm allocative efficiency – 
often termed productive efficiency or x-efficiency – which affects the ability of a firm to 
produce output at minimum cost.  Productive and, consequently, allocative efficiency are 
affected by the principal-agent issues that attend decision making under asymmetric 
information in uncertain environments that, together with demand and cost 
characteristics, motivate different institutions.11 They are intrinsic to economic activity 
and although they may be economised under particular institutional arrangements, they 
cannot be eliminated. For this reason the highest achievable (allocatively) efficient 
outcome, is necessarily constrained, or second-best, efficient.  
 
The second category is dynamic efficiency. It can be measured as the present value of 
total surplus into the future, where investment and innovation are explicitly recognised. 
Because it is forward-looking it should recognise uncertainty associated with demand and 
                                                 
7   Where the costs of producing two or more products jointly are less than the costs of producing 
them separately. 
8   See Stigler (1951). 
9   Gal (2001) reports that studies of manufacturing industries in small economies show a 
considerably larger fraction of all output is produced at less than minimum effficient scale. 
10   Total economic surplus is the total willingness to pay of consumers less the total cost of 
production, or the  sum of producers’ and consumers’ surplus. Consumers’ surplus is measured as the area 
under the demand curve and above the unit price.  The concept of consumers’ surplus relies on the fact that, 
under some assumptions (for example, an absence of income effects is sufficient), the market demand curve 
shows the welfare of various increments of output (see Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995), s.10c), for 
issues in this interpretation).  Where the market demand curve consists of firms there are, of course, no 
income effects to be considered. Producers’ surplus is calculated in a  symmetric way, as the amount the 
producer receives over and above the minimal payment that enables it to supply, and has an analogous 
interpretation (see Mishan (1963)).   
11   See Hansmann (1996)  and Jensen and Meckling (1976) for reviews of institutional design in the 
context of agency issues.  
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cost and its relationship to investment and innovation. Investment and innovation are key 
to achieving dynamic efficiency, and they require that attention be paid to the incentives 
and barriers relating to the dynamic process of investment and innovation. Both 
economic arguments and empirical studies of the literature confirm dynamic efficiency 
gains are more important for social welfare than static efficiency gains.12 Goolsbee 
(2000), for example, stresses that delayed innovation and investment lead to missing 
markets where both consumers’ and producers’ surplus are missing. The welfare loss 
from a missing market may swamp allocative efficiency effects pertaining to existing 
markets, or existing levels of investment. Goolsbee op cit and Hausman (1997) for 
different cases find very substantial welfare losses arising from delayed markets caused 
by regulatory settings.  
 
It should be apparent that evaluations of static and dynamic efficiency of an action or 
practice simply entail the application of long established principles of cost-benefit 
analysis in the comparison of “factual” and “counterfactual” situations.13 In a seminal 
article, Williamson (1968) tied cost-benefit analysis to competition law in proposing that, 
as a general matter, a horizontal merger could benefit an economy if it allowed the firms 
to achieve “efficiency gains” – in his case, a reduction in their per-unit operating costs – 
even in the presence of an increase in price. Because these efficiency gains allow any 
given level of output to be produced with fewer inputs, such a merger would free up 
resources that could be used in other industries and potentially lower prices to consumers 
in those markets. In essence, Williamson argued for, what is now known in the legal 
profession as, an “efficiencies defense”, for mergers and commercial practices that 
increase total surplus. 
 
                                                 
12   The classic reference on static efficiency is Harberger (1954) who estimated that the total welfare  
loss due to market power is no larger than 0.1 percent of GNP. A potential counter-argument to  
Harberger’s estimate is provided by the theory of rent seeking. It suggests that, in cases where a  
firm has an ability to capture an oligopoly or monopoly rent, economic agents have an incentive to  
compete for it. This competition can involve economically wasteful activities such as lobbying,  
unnecessary litigation or even crime (e.g. bribery). The form of such competition will depend upon the 
nature of barriers to entry.   
13   The principles of cost-benefit analysis have been established for some 30 years (see Mishan 
(1988) for a review) 
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The background to Williamson’s paper was the observation that in the US, mergers were 
challenged by antitrust authorities if they held the prospect of higher prices. Katz (2004, 
19) argues that this price threshold was implemented in the past by public policies that 
sought atomistic competition (For example the Robinson Patman Act 1936 in the United 
States), but that such an approach is anachronistic. Katz proposes that the modern view of 
United States antitrust authorities is suggested by a recent decision of the United States 
Supreme Court that included the statement: 
The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of 
monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-
market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices – at least for a short 
period – is what attracts “business acumen” in the first place: it induces risk 
taking that produces innovation and economic growth. 14  
 
It is not by chance that the consumer price threshold test was the consequence of policies 
that focused on “atomistic competition” for this is the basis of the textbook, static, perfect 
competition world, in which demand and supply are passive in terms of the actions of 
individual agents of any kind. It doesn’t incorporate, to any useful degree of 
approximation, the dynamic process of the evolution of markets, and especially the 
markets of a small economy. The notion of “perfect” competition should not be the test of 
practices and transactions under competition law: static models have limitations in 
representing rivalry. There are many static models of few demanders and/or suppliers that 
relax certain assumptions of perfect competition, but many of these too fail to capture the 
dynamic process of competition that is paramount in the Supreme Court’s statement.15  
What is meant by competition is critical to what test is desirable. 
 
The New Zealand Commerce Act 1986 does not define competition, although it does 
refer to “workable or effective” competition at s 3(1).  Gault at CA 3.15, reviews court 
and tribunal interpretations and suggests the phrase has its genesis in the decision of the 
Australian Trade Tribunal in Re Queensland Co-op Milling Assn Ltd; Re Defiance 
                                                 
14   Verizon Communications Inc. vs Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP (2004) 540 US 398, 407 
Scalia J. 
15   For example, many few-agent Cournot and Bertrand game theory models do not capture the 
essence of dynamic competitive processes. 
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Holdings Ltd. (1976) 25 FLR 169; 8 ALR 481; ATPR 40-012, where it describes 
workable competition as including 
 “….mechanism for the discovery of market information and for enforcement of  
business decisions in light of this information.., and …a creative role for firms in 
devising new product, the new technology, the more effective service or improved 
cost efficiency. And there are rewards as well as punishments. …”16
 
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (1998, 531) defines competition as being: 
 
[R]ivalry between individuals (or groups or nations), and it arises whenever two 
or more parties strive for something that all cannot obtain. 
 
Legal and economic meanings imply that the essence of competition is rivalry. This 
interpretation is linked to economic concepts by Baumol (2002) who emphasises that 
competition is about the process of interactions among suppliers and demanders, and that 
it is this process over time that engenders dynamic efficiency. There is nothing in this 
process that singles out price rises as indicative of declines in prospective welfare, and 
hence dynamic efficiency.17  
 
The Commerce Act may not define competition per se but the Act’s purpose provision 
(Section 1A) states: 
 
The purpose of this Act is to promote competition in markets for the long-term 
benefit of consumers within New Zealand. 
 
This is strongly suggestive of a link between the process of competition and the goal of 
efficiency.18 It indicates that the framers of the Act intended that the Act should promote 
competition, in such a way that enhances the performance of markets in delivering 
                                                 
16   Gault on Commercial Law, 2005, Brookers, Wellington 
17  Fershtman and Pakes (2000), for example, describe a model in which collusion and price wars  
arise endogenously over time and which are necessary for efficient performance of the industry. 
18   See also Gault op cit CA1A.05. 
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benefits to consumers in the future.19 Thus, competition is to be the instrument, and 
future consumer welfare the objective, under the Commerce Act. Plainly, static welfare 
or welfare today are not the targets of the Act.20
 
The meaning to be attached to s 1A is critical because where the purpose of an act is 
clear, the text of that act should be interpreted to give effect to that purpose. Further, 
there is a legislative direction that such a purposive approach is required. The 
Interpretation Act 1999, s 5 provides: 
 
 Ascertaining meaning of legislation  
    (1)     The meaning of an enactment must be ascertained from its 
text and in the light of its purpose.  
    (2)     The matters that may be considered in ascertaining the 
meaning of an enactment include the indications provided in the 
enactment.  
    (3)     Examples of those indications are preambles, the analysis, 
a table of contents, headings to Parts and sections, marginal notes, 
diagrams, graphics, examples and explanatory material, and the 
organisation and format of the enactment. 
 
Although the plain meaning of words in an act are the starting point, where the text 
benefits from clarification and when it strains to fit the purpose of an act, the purposive 
meaning of the act has a determinative role to play.21  
 
                                                 
19  Indeed, the basic test of the Commerce Act for commercial practices and mergers concerns 
whether there is likely to be a substantial lessening of competition under the relevant action. The  
Commission, acting under s 61(6) and s 67(3), can authorise an action which would “likely result in a 
benefit to the public which would outweigh the lessening of competition that would result.” (emphasis 
added). The threshold for the test for price control under Part IV of the Act seems lesser in that it is a 
“market in which competition is limited or is likely to be lessened” (s 52). 
20  Katz (2004, 56) argues that, in the United States the Department of Justice and Federal Trade 
Commission apply a similar view in antitrust law. Trebilcock (2004) surveys the continuing evolution of 
the Canadian position, and suggests that the interpretation of an efficiencies defence statute is not settled. It 
reports that a recent case (the Superior Propane Case) ultimately decided on a “balancing weights 
criterion” that gave an answer close to the total total surplus criterion, although in the final appeal the 
Commissioner sought, unsuccessfully, a weight of zero on producer surplus ( The Commissioner of 
Competition v Superior Propane Inc (2003) 23 cpr (4th), 316 (FCA)).  Trebilcock op cit,  suggests that 
decisions based upon the balancing weights and total surplus will generally coincide. The controversy 
engendered by the Superior Propane case was stimulated by an incorrect calculation of total surplus 
(Mathewson and Winter (2000)), and it illustrates the arbitrary nature of weights. 
21   The retrospective application of the Interpretation Act 1999, at s.4(1), implies that it is applicable 
to all acts, including the Commerce Act 1986. 
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The purpose statement of the Commerce Act is in accord with the concept of dynamic 
efficiency since it treats competition as a process aimed at enhancing resource allocation, 
including the processes of innovation and investment, for market-determined future 
consumer welfare.  In this context then, is the present value of total surplus a reasonable 
conceptual and practical criterion for the assessment of actions under the Commerce Act? 
If we take as given that static efficiency at any point in time is best measured by total 
surplus, then it is reasonable to take the present value of total surplus as the criterion for 
assessing alternatives under the Act. This will indicate the aggregate of net benefits 
resulting from resource allocation and investment and innovation processes to individuals 
in the economy.  The question then reduces to whether or not total surplus - that is, cost-
benefit analysis in which benefits and costs are treated neutrally - is the appropriate 
criterion at any point in time; but assessed within the context of the long-term benefit of 
consumers.  
 
The main class of departures from total surplus arises when different parts of the surplus 
are given different weights for different consumers and producers.22 Such a practice has 
in the past been routinely applied by the World Bank in conducting cost-benefit analyses 
of projects, and has been quite widely applied by the Commerce Commission.23 The 
World Bank’s justification for the differential weighting is that of incidence of project 
benefits and costs. It sought to place emphasis on projects that benefited particular 
sections of the community in those countries the Bank offered its services to.24   
 
                                                 
22   Some weighting schemes may have the effect of counting as a net benefit a transfer among 
consumers and producers. Katz op cit notes that this plainly contradicts the Pareto principle. The 
Commission has utilized such a weighting: examples include its draft reports in the gas pipelines, and 
mobile termination rate enquiries. 
23   The Commission has supported this approach in its Pohokura gas joint marketing authorisation 
(Commerce Commission Decision 505 (2003)), telecommunications unbundling (Commerce Commission 
Section 64 Review and Schedule 3 Investigation into Unbundling the Local Loop Network and the Fixed 
Public Data Network: Final Report (2003)), price control evaluation of mobile termination rates 
(Commerce Commission Mobile Termination Rates: Draft Report (2004)), Air New Zealand-Qantas 
cooperative arrangement (Commerce Commission Decision 511 (2003)) (check) and gas pipeline 
regulation evaluations (Commerce Commission Section 56 Gas Control Inquiry: Final Report (2004)) 
among others . 
24  See Anandarup (1984). Irvin (1978, ch. 8) briefly summarises the approaches proposed to that 
date. The modern approach of the World Bank is to place less weight on narrow cost-benefit analysis of 
projects, and to focus on their governance and role in institutional evolution (World Bank (2000)) This shift 
to consideration of process reflects an enhanced focus on dynamic efficiency. 
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The use of cost-benefit analysis in competition law is typically different from its common 
application to projects; most obviously because this law has the objective of using 
competition to enhance the long-term interest of consumers. Any justification of 
differential weighting of cost-benefit surpluses under competition law can only be based 
upon (long-term) incidence, or on enhancing rivalry.  
 
Assessing any link between total surplus and the Commerce Act first requires 
consideration of the definition of consumers under this Act. Candidates include a) end-
users, as in the Telecommunications Act 2001 (s 18) which, arguably, means any 
economic agent, be it firm or household that is not in the business of telecommunications, 
b) any consumer of goods and services, including those firms that may fall in the same 
industrial classification, as a practical matter this is the definition used in competition law 
and, often in, regulatory cost-benefit analysis c) “final consumers” being the position of 
individuals or households as consumers, producers and factor suppliers, or d) the “final 
demands”, that is the consumption of consumers.  Given that it is the long term interest of 
consumers that matters, and the fact that this entails good performance in all relevant 
markets no matter how narrow the ultimate objective, cases a) and b) can be viewed as 
intermediate to cases c) and d).     
 
If consumers means “final consumers” as individuals and households they are producers, 
suppliers of factors of production, and final consumers: the welfare of consumers is 
determined by all of these activities and to distinguish among them in any category under 
competition law would require identifying long term incidence, including the effect of the 
transfer process itself. There are several reasons to conclude that the cost-benefit 
surpluses should be treated neutrally.  
 
2.1 Incidence 
 
First, the difficulty in assessing incidence is well known, and renders moot the utility of 
attempting any assessment, yet without knowing incidence across households and 
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individuals the welfare effect of differential weighting cannot be established.25 
Assessment of incidence in a static setting conceptually requires inversion of a detailed 
general equilibrium model that is generally not possible. Static incidence is particularly 
difficult to evaluate when consuming units may be firms, individuals and households. 
These difficulties are materially enlarged when the long-term benefit of consumers is 
considered; for then the effects of, and on, investment and innovation have to be assumed 
and worked through in order to estimate incidence given that long-term benefit is the goal 
of the Act.  
 
If differential weighting among consuming and producing units were to be the province 
of decisions under competition law then it might be expected that the statute provide the 
relevant guidance as to differential weighting, however it does not.26 The state has other 
institutions of taxation, social welfare and direct provision that it uses to affect income 
redistribution.27 The inability to estimate incidence suggests that these more direct 
methods of transfer by the state are much more efficient ways to target households and 
individuals for income redistribution, thus it is not surprising that criteria for transfers are 
not provided in competition law statutes. 
 
A second interpretation of the Act would be that New Zealand competition law does 
discriminate in that it seeks the enhancement of the benefit of consumers in their role as 
“final demanders” per se. This is a narrower goal and one more difficult to justify for 
welfare gains than that of consumers per se. Nevertheless, treating final consumption as 
the desirable target does not imply different weights among consumers and producers and 
factor owners at any point in time. If competition law is to be implemented for the long-
term benefit of final consumption then processes of efficient investment and innovation 
must be enabled.  The effect of any differential weighting of elements of total surplus for 
the competitive process will affect the welfare of final consumption. It will also affect 
                                                 
25 See Mishan (1988, 201-202, 210-211). 
26 It is considered below whether Part 1A of the Act, in particular its reference to “consumers within New 
Zealand”, and the reference in Part 4 of the Act to “benefits to acquirers” imply discrimination among 
producers and consumers in surplus calculations. 
27 It is a long established cost-benefit analysis proposition that where the income distribution is optimal, 
perhaps as a result of tax and social welfare policies, or price changes are small that total surplus accurately 
represents welfare changes.   
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long-term incidence between consumers, as consuming, producing and factor supply 
agents that would again be virtually impossible to unravel.28  The unpredictability of 
incidence under any interpretation and the lack of a rationale for, and statutory 
specification of, unequal weighting of surpluses under competition law suggest that any 
rationale for non-neutrality in the treatment of surpluses must lie with its effect on the 
competitive process. 
 
2.2  The Process of Competition 
 
It is common in cost-benefit to calculate the surplus from a sequence of snapshots of 
markets in (perhaps temporary) equilibria into the future. Such a sequence assumes a 
concomitant investment and innovation profile, although commonly the investment 
process is not modelled.  The incentives for investment and innovation relate to the 
ability to make and retain profit; thus profit has the dual roles of incentivising and 
enabling investment, and providing the asset owners with utility. Because the cost-benefit 
analysis is forward looking there is also considerable uncertainty relating to a wide range 
of factors extending from the business cycle to entry and technical change. The profit 
inducement to rivalry and the uncertainty that attend investment and innovation renders 
determining a level of profit that will prospectively reward and enable investment 
extremely difficult.29 To down-weight profit in the application of competition law is to 
reduce incentives for competition in product and ownership markets, entry and 
investment in that industry: that is, reduce rivalry. 30 The literature (see Baumol (2002), 
Shapiro (2002) and CRA(2002) for the case of the new economy in particular) suggests 
that the efficient development of industries requires the removal of barriers to entry rather 
                                                 
28   For example, consider the challenge of determining incidence of a missing market between 
consumers and producers. 
29  That even the volatility - let alone the mean - of profits has an important effect on investment 
decisions is apparent from the literature on price cap regulation (see, for example, Evans and Guthrie 
(2005) and Dobbs (2004)).  
30  Setting aside incidence, any assessment of benefits to the competitive process associated with 
placing a lower weight on profit, is not indicated by the magnitude of transfers resulting from differential 
weighting of surpluses: rather it would consist of the present value of the change in total surplus into the 
future that would be a consequence of these weights. 
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than concern with the level of a market’s concentration.  Evans and Schmalensee (2001, 
47) explain it in this way: 
 
In particular, the analysis of market power in new economy industries must 
consider the vulnerability of leading firms to entry powered by drastic innovation, 
not just to the entry of firms producing equivalent products with known processes.  
Analysis of this sort of fragility may require difficult judgements about the 
likelihood of disruptive innovations in the future, but simply to assume such 
innovations cannot occur is to ignore history and to impart substantial and 
obvious bias to market power analysis in important sectors. 
 
The absence of a positive link between the act of down-weighting producers’ relative to 
consumers’ surplus, and rivalry, when taken together with the purpose of the Act suggest 
that there is no rationale for non-neutral treatment of producers’ and consumers’ surplus. 
31
 
In the context of a small open economy equally weighting consumers’ and producers’ 
surpluses, and thereby utilising a total surplus standard, is particularly important. To do 
otherwise would jeopardise the ability of the economy to achieve even the limited scale 
economies that its industries are capable of. 32 The point has even more force when it is 
recognised that in many industries of a small economy scale economies can only be 
achieved by exporting. The calculation of total surplus in a small open economy in 
industries where a large fraction of output is exported entails applying the total surplus 
calculation to both the domestic and foreign markets. Particularly where export prices are 
exogenous it may be that the only surplus gain of a merger or commercial practice lies in 
producer surplus. To ignore or ascribe a lower weight to domestic and/or (potential) 
export generated producers’ suplus would be to inhibit activity and investment in these 
industries.  
                                                 
31   Regulation is mooted for situations where competition is limited. Some regulation has been 
designed with the purpose of enhancing competition; but with a debatable effect on rivalry and dynamic 
efficiency.  Perhaps the most prominent application of regulation that seeks to enhance competition is that 
of access regulation as applied to deemed network natural monopolies. The outcomes do not clearly 
suggest that the long term interest of consumers is enhanced since they reflect a trade-off between 
competition in downstream markets at the cost of limiting competition in the regulated market (examples 
include Crandall, Ingraham and Singer (2004) and Boles de Boer, Enright and Evans (2000)). 
32   There is literature that argues that entry (competition) can be excessive (see Evans and Hughes 
(2003) for discussion) in which case total surplus provides the correct basis of evaluation. 
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3 Application Under New Zealand Competition Law 
 
This section examines whether the references to “consumers within New Zealand” in the 
price control provisions of Parts 4 and 4A of the Act imply discrimination among 
producers and consumers in surplus calculations.  It is useful first to very briefly review 
the legal context. 
 
The s 1A was introduced on 26 May 2001 and it implies a focus on the long-term benefit 
of consumers. It applies to all parts of the Commerce Act, including the price control s 
52, and Part 4A which has its own purpose statement (s 57E): although s 52 makes no 
reference to the long-term interest.33  Its application to trade practices and mergers is 
covered under the authorisation process of s 3A where a test enables a lessening of 
competition to be balanced against a benefit to the public. The benefit to the public 
interpreted in the light of the long-term interest of consumers suggests a (dynamic) total 
surplus test, providing benefit to consumers does not conflict with benefit to the public. A 
recent High Court decision of  Hansen  J and Vautier (Lay Member) found that the term 
benefit to the public was intentionally broader than consumers (p 240) and that the 
authorisation test concerns resource implications for the long term interests of consumers 
(p 241).34 This position admits the preceeding argument that, even if the term consumers 
                                                 
33  Part 4 of the Commerce Act also contains electricity lines business control regulations, which in 
turn contains s 57E: 
 The purpose of this subpart is to promote the efficient operation of markets directly related to  
electricity distribution and transmission services through targeted control of for the long term  
benefit of consumers by ensuring that suppliers- 
(a) are limited in their ability to extract excessive profits; and 
(b) face strong incentives to improve efficiency and provide services at a quality that 
reflects consumer demands; and 
(c) share the benefits of efficiency gains with consumers, including through lower 
prices. 
The statement reaffirms the goal of the long-term benefit of consumers and proposes elements of the route 
by which this may be achieved. Interpreted in this context this section does not disturb the proposition that 
total surplus over time be the criterion for regulatory interventions; it plainly does not argue for short-term 
transfers between producers and consumers, that have any potentiality for deleterious effects on investment 
and consumer-demanded quality. The counterfactual to judge “lower prices”, for example, should be 
defined with respect to the other provisions relating to long-term efficiency gains and quality.    
34   Legal interpretations of public benefit have focused upon a public/private dichotomy: rather than a 
functional difference (see Gault op cit 3A.05), in which case public benefit and the long term benefit of 
consumers may well coincide. 
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refers to consumers in their consumption role only, that the total surplus criterion would 
be in their long-term interest. However, reference to the interest of consumers as 
including all their roles may approach very closely the notion of benefit to the public: for 
there can be other additional dimensions to public.35   
 
The benefits to acquirers test arises under Part 4 of the Act where the Commerce 
Commission determines whether or not (a form of price) control is to be applied. Section 
52 states that:   
 Goods or services may be controlled if- 
(a) The goods or services are, or will be, supplied or acquired in a market in 
which competition is limited or is likely to be lessened; and 
(b) It is necessary or desirable for those goods or services to be controlled 
either- 
(i)In the interests of persons acquiring the goods or services (whether 
directly or indirectly), if the goods or services are acquired from a person 
who faces limited or lessened competition for the supply of those goods or 
services; or 
(ii)In the interests of of suppliers, if the goods or services are supplied to a 
person who faces limited or lessened competition for the acquisition of 
those goods or services. 
 
The reference to acquirers of the goods and services, whether directly or indirectly raises 
a conundrum for the Act. Plainly, in a static setting interests of acquirers may be in 
conflict  with benefits to consumers for there is no reason why benefiting the interests of 
acquirers of particular goods and services, at the expense of any other provider or 
consumer, should enhance the aggregate welfare of consumers. However, there is nothing 
to suggest that the full purpose of the Act – namely long-term benefit for consumers – 
should not be applied.  Viewed in the context of the full purpose of the Act the controls 
under Section 52 should be applied insofar as they enhance the long term benefit of 
consumers. 36  Under this interpretation, the interests of acquirers exist insofar as they 
lead to the long term benefit of consumers, wherein, on the argument adduced above for 
the case of the consumption of consumers, the present value of total surplus is again the 
                                                 
35   Air New Zealand and Qantas Limited v Commerce Commission, Infratil Group, Virgin Blue and 
Gullivers Pacific CIV 2003 404 6590, 319, 422-425 (reported at [2004] 3 NZLR 550). 
36   Indeed, the Commerce Commission can also make authorizations with respect to prices, revenues 
and quality standards pursuant to Controlled Goods or Services (Part 4), and in so doing the Commission is 
explicitly enjoined at s 70A to have regard to the promotion of efficiency.  
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appropriate criterion.37 Most obviously, static transfers to acquirers that might arise from 
producer-consumer transfers associated with price control at a point in time, will not be 
in the long-term interests of acquirers were investment, innovation and quality to be 
affected.  
 
It is thus of significance that price control (Part 4) is included in the Act. It is part of the 
Commerce Act and therefore should be assessed in the context of this Act. It suggests 
that the role of (price control) regulation is to induce “competition-like outcomes” when 
it is deemed that competition is not sufficient. If regulation were to be instituted for other 
reasons, such as the differential treatment of interest groups, a different regulatory 
framework would be relevant, and the role of economic analysis different because the 
objective would not be the long-term benefit of consumers. 
 
In applying the statute the Commission is enjoined to conduct a public benefits test by 
Section 3A38 of the Act, which provides: 
  
Where the Commission is required under this Act to determine whether or not, or 
the extent to which, conduct will result, or will be likely to result, in a benefit to 
the public, the Commission shall have regard to any efficiencies that the 
Commission considers will result, or will be likely to result. 
 
Particularly in small open economies and in some industries, some considerable fraction 
of economic activity may be conducted by foreign firms, and certain of the aggregate 
benefits of domestic commerce may rest with foreign consumers. This raises the question 
as to what consideration can, or should, be given to markets (consumers or producers) 
outside New Zealand or foreign ownership in assessing public benefits and detriments 
under the Commerce Act, and if considered, to what extent, if any, differential weighting 
should be applied in the public benefits test. The neutral treatment of consumers and 
producers is implicitly accepted in the recent High Court judgment of Hansen  J and 
                                                 
37  Part 4 of the Act empowers the Commission to institute price regulation. It is part of the 
Commerce Act and therefore should be assessed in the context of this Act. Moreover generally, regulation 
is implemented for various purposes, prominent among them is satisfying the demands for particular 
treatment by special interest groups.  The role of economic analysis is different under such regulation.   
38 Inserted by Section 4 of the Commerce Amendment Act 1990. 
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Vautier (Lay Member) on an appeal against the Commerce Commission’s decision to 
decline Air New Zealand and Qantas’ application for an alliance arrangement.39
 
In this consideration, it is taken as given that Section 3A refers to the public of New 
Zealand, domestic consumers and producers are equally weighted,  and only the 
implications of foreign ownership of firms are considered. Foreign consumers are so 
diffuse and passive from New Zealand’s viewpoint that their responses will not much 
directly affect New Zealand consumers’ and producers’ welfare, and hence the welfare of 
the public of this country.40 The position can be justified by the assumption that foreign 
markets for New Zealand are relatively competitive.  
 
Section 3(1A) of the Act provides: 
 
Every reference in this Act, except the reference in section 36A(1)(b) and (c) of 
this Act, to the term “market” is a reference to a market in New Zealand for 
goods or services as well as other goods or services that, as a matter of fact and 
commercial common sense, are substitutable for them. 
  
This definition indicates that it is markets within New Zealand that are the primary 
concern when implementing the provisions of the Commerce Act.  The focus on New 
Zealand markets (consumers and producers) does not differentiate between domestic and 
foreign consumers or firms.  The provisions of the Commerce Act operate regardless of 
who is operating in the market.41
  
The Commerce Commission’s publication “Guidelines to the Analysis of public benefits 
and detriments” (1994) provided that the “public” is the public of New Zealand and that 
                                                 
39   Ibid at 43-45 
40   This is not to say that their demands will not materially affect the design of New Zealand export 
products, or that product evolution represented by this design will, and has, not affected New Zealand’s 
exports and terms of trade. 
41   Section 4(1) of the Act provides: 
This Act extends to the engaging in conduct outside New Zealand by any person resident or 
carrying on business in New Zealand to the extent that such conduct affects a market in New 
Zealand. 
This clearly extends the coverage of the Act to conduct outside the borders of New Zealand provided there 
is an impact on a market in New Zealand.  Therefore a foreign owned firm or foreign consumer is subject 
to the Commerce Act provided the conduct had an impact in a market in New Zealand. 
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benefits to foreigners are to be counted only to the extent that they also involve benefits 
to New Zealanders.42  This publication (revised in 1997) no longer accurately records the 
Commission's view.43  The Commission has often cited the comments by the Court of 
Appeal in the AMPS-A decision44 as an authority on the treatment of benefits to foreign 
firms.45  
 
Greig J, Brunt and Shaw (Lay Members) in that decision stated:46
 
We reject any view that profits earned by overseas investment in this country are 
necessarily to be regarded as a drain on New Zealand.  New Zealand seeks to be 
a member of a liberal multilateral trading and investment community.  Consistent 
with this stance, we observe that improvements in international efficiency create 
gains from trade and investment which, from a long-run perspective, benefit the 
New Zealand public... On the other hand, if there are circumstances in which the 
exercise of market power gives rise to functionless monopoly rents, supra-normal 
profits that arise neither from cost savings nor innovation, and which accrue to 
overseas shareholders, we think it right to regard these as exploitation of the New 
Zealand community and to be counted as a detriment to the public. 
 
This position of the Court and the neutral treatment of consumers and producers is 
implicitly accepted in the recent High Court judgment of Hansen J and Vautier (Lay 
Member) on Air New Zealand and Qantas’ application for an alliance arrangement. 47
 
In the AMPS-A decision the Court was suggesting that whether an efficiency defence to a 
merger or commercial practice will differ according to whether or not the relevant firm is 
foreign-owned turns upon the interpretation of functionless monopoly rents. If 
functionless refers to rents that have no implications for behaviour that is to the long-term 
benefit of consumers there will be only very limited possibilities of appeal to 
                                                 
42   The same position is taken by Pickford (1993). 
43   The Review of the Commerce Act in 1992 resulted in a recommendation concerning this issue.  
The amendment was never made but the recommendation was that a section be inserted to the effect that: 
Benefits which accrue outside of New Zealand but which create gains from trade and investment for New 
Zealand are regarded as benefits to the public. 
44   Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Limited v Commerce Commission (1991) 4 TCLR 473. 
45    See for example , Air NZ/Ansett/Bodas (decision 278, p 449), Powerco (decision 302, p 294), 
Pohokura (decision 505, p 447), and Final Determination of Air NZ/Qantas p 907. 
46   Ibid at 531. 
47   Ibid 
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discrimination on grounds of ownership in efficiency calculations.  Absent regulatory 
barriers to entry, profits are the catalyst to competition, entry and innovation that 
enhances dynamic efficiency.   If this function of profit is admitted under competition law 
there will be very few instances where foreign ownership discrimination is applicable. 48  
Alternatively, if the rents are statically treated as functionless, and their effect on 
competition and innovation ignored, there will be many examples of efficiency 
computations potentially materially affected by the Court’s caveat.49  
 
Even if profits were considered functionless and discrimination were contemplated it 
would have to be on the basis of incidence, in which case incidence-affecting issues 
should be considered before application of discrimination. These include the fact that the 
New Zealand (foreign) public may own some proportion of relevant foreign (domestic) 
firms, and these firms are generally liable to pay domestic taxes on any surplus earned in 
a New Zealand market: such taxes are a benefit to the public of New Zealand.50  
 
Since competition law is a constraint on institutions of trade, including those of 
contracting,51 its neutral application is required if the availability, enforceability and 
uptake of contracts is to be neutral as between domestic and foreign-owned firms. Indeed, 
the argument for the treatment of the long-term benefit of consumers, and efficiencies as 
dynamic efficiency with the total surplus criterion is the same as the rationale for security 
                                                 
48  It is noteworthy that among the myriad of cases where there is potential for foreign/domestic 
discrimination to arise – e.g. in Clear Corporation’s repudiation of elements of its interconnection contract 
with Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Limited (see Evans and Quigley (2000)), and regulation of the 
telecommunications industry under the 2001 Telecommunications Act – it has not been introduced as a 
material factor in Court or regulatory proceedings in New Zealand. 
49  The Commission seems to have adopted this view in its cost-benefit studies. For example, in the 
Authorisation of Pohokura joint marketing of gas the Commission argued that only because foreign 
ownership was on both sides of the market would it not discriminate on a foreign ownership basis in its 
counting of benefits and detriments. In the context of the High Court’s position, this treatment is 
tantamount to suggesting that surpluses in the petroleum and gas exploration and field development 
industries held by foreign entities are inessential, in terms of the long-term benefit of consumers, to 
investment in those industries.  
50   In the Commission’s draft determination of its pipeline enquiry it treated surpluses accruing to 
domestic and foreign owned firms differently: in essence treating surpluses to foreign-owned firms as a 
detriment. No attempt was made to assess incidence in any detail. It ignored domestic taxes and whether or 
not the foreign owned firms were earning a “normal” return on their actual investment (as opposed to the 
Commission’s assessment of what this investment “ought” to have been). 
51  For example, see Evans and Quigley (2005). 
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of contract.52 Unless contracts are impartially enforced transactions and investment will 
be affected.53 In particular if foreign-owned firms perceive that contracts are not 
enforceable in New Zealand they will either not transact in New Zealand or they will 
write into New Zealand contracts that they be enforceable in other jurisdictions. To treat 
firms within the same (New Zealand) market differently – under competition and/or 
contract law – according to domestic or foreign ownership would hamper dynamic 
efficiency because it would imply that existing foreign-owned firms in New Zealand 
would be discriminated against in administrative commerce decisions.54 If firms were 
fully informed of the discriminatory policy before they entered, fewer foreign-owner 
firms would enter and thereby competition and concomitantly the dynamic efficiency of 
New Zealand markets would be reduced.55 Where this inhibits the uptake and 
development of innovations the loss in welfare would, based on all the evidence, be very 
large.56
 
The argument for enforcement of contracts – despite the existence of ex post outcomes 
that could be more efficient on a static efficiency basis – is that the limitation of 
opportunistic behaviour that is proscribed under enforceable contracts enhances dynamic 
efficiency. This is exactly the rationale for neutral treatment of domestically and foreign 
owned firms in efficiency tests under competition law and regulation. 
                                                 
52  See for example the discussions of Posner (1992, ch4) and Cooter and Ulen (2004, chs 6 and 7). 
53   The central test for lawful commercial practices and arrangements under the Commerce Act is that 
of a likely substantial lessening of competition. In this context, there are two circumstances in which 
discriminating against foreign- relative to domestic-owned firms may arise.  First, where there is doubt 
about the prospect of lessened competition, and even where there is no doubt, but benefits exceed some 
lessening of competition – as assessed in authorisations – a public benefit test is informative and influences 
decisions. Secondly, penalties for breaches of competition law should reflect damage to the public of New 
Zealand and these are indicated by the public benefits test. This was the position taken in the judgement of 
Commerce Commission v Caltex New Zealand Ltd [Penalty], (2000) 9 TCLR 366, 372 p 26-28. Even if 
determination of a breach does not entail discrimination, the penalty may well do so, and thereby induce 
discrimination against firms that are foreign-owned. 
54   In fact, because the Commission discriminated against foreign ownership in its draft-
determination gas pipeline enquiry cost-benefit analysis, its public benefits test suggested that foreign-
owned firms should be regulated much more stringently than domestically-held firms. Rather than re-
examine its definition of benefits and detriments the Commission (p. 171) suggested caution in applying 
the public benefits test.  
55   Companies with listed shares are pressured to be productively efficient by the threat of takeover in 
the market for ownership and this is enhanced by the presence of foreign-owned firms. Indeed, in a small 
economy (potential) entry by foreign firms is a particularly important source of managerial and ownership 
competition.  
56  See Goolsbee and Hausman op cit. 
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4  The Efficiency Test in New Zealand 
  
As trade and investment policies of most countries have liberalised over the past 20 
years, there has been considerable convergence of competition and regulatory policies; 
fostered in part by international organisations such as the OECD and WTO.  For this 
reason, and because the issues are similar, central elements of competition law are 
common to different countries.  However, while the law is similar and techniques for its 
application almost identical, application does materially differ across countries.  To the 
extent that there are substantive differences between countries on the basis of their size 
and location it is likely that implementation should be different even under the same 
statute. As Gal (2001) points out, the level of the US thresholds are simply not 
appropriate for small economies as they would create barriers to efficient mergers. 
Acceptance of the thesis that small isolated economies are different from large economies 
in their absence of economies of scale and necessarily more concentrated markets implies 
that, at a minimum, implementation of competition law would differ across countries. 
Emphasising the efficiency defense relatively more in smaller economies will permit the 
more restrictive competition law conditions of larger economies; which is likely to be 
dynamically efficient. 
 
In addition, it is argued that the focus of competition authorities should shift from the 
structure of industry to the conduct of individual firms in the markets of modern 
economies. CRA (2002), and Shapiro (2002), for example, conclude that competition 
laws in new-economy markets should concentrate on removal of barriers to entry and its 
alleged effect on competition. They argue that the distinguishing feature of competition 
law for new-economy goods is that it should be applied with the objective of dynamic 
efficiency. Given this, it would be desirable to apply the efficiency defence on a case-by-
case basis across the economy.57  
                                                 
57 This does not mean that the competition authority may not develop rules of thumb about practices that go 
to dynamic efficiency and which limit case-by-case considerations. It might, for example, reach a 
presumption that long-term contracts by joint ventures in industries with much risk and sunk costs – e.g. in 
oil and gas exploration and production – will generally be efficient and therefore be readily authorised. For 
example, as it does now, the Commerce Act may permit certain actions among joint venture parties. 
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Cooperation is important to efficiently deal with externalities  that arise in areas such as  
innovation and standard setting. The ability to semi-formally co-ordinate is provided 
through joint ventures. There is a growing body of literature that argues that it is not 
efficient to limit coordination by per se offenses, as these impose direct and indirect 
inhibitions on potentially economically efficient coordination.58 This literature argues that 
rule of reason should apply, notwithstanding that monitoring and transaction costs of 
enforcement may be reduced by the per se approach. In small economies the issue is 
likely to be particularly acute because of the low population of firms in highly 
concentrated industries. In such circumstances any communication is likely to involve a 
significant share of the market and seem widespread. But to inhibit cooperation in such 
small markets is unlikely to be efficient.  
 
It is likely that regulatory institutions have economies of scale that, of  itself, imply that 
the average cost of socially desirable competition law enforcement will fall with the size 
of the economy, which may imply optimally relatively less activity. The complexity of 
the dynamic efficiency issues and the need to consider the avenue of efficiency defences 
– rule of reason – suggest a resource intensive regulatory authority. However, savings 
may be achieved in focussing on barriers to entry at the expense of market structure and 
static efficiency test thresholds.  
 
In small isolated economies there can be expected to be a larger fraction of domestic 
markets that are concentrated. In these economies it is important that case-by-case 
application of the efficiencies criteria are applied to mergers and practices, particularly at 
the expense of rote application of competition rules of thumb derived from other 
jurisdictions.59 The desirability of utilising economies of scale, perhaps by enabling 
exporting and enhancing dynamic efficiency means that the efficiency defense should be 
applied using the total surplus criterion. On similar grounds it is generally not desirable to 
distinguish between foreign and domestic entities in the efficiencies calculation. The 
                                                 
58   See Fershtman and Pakes op cit, by way of an example. 
59   This is the position of Khemani (1991, 219).  
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recent suggestions for the implementation of competition law in modern economies are 
designed to enhance dynamic efficiency and they are suited to direct application in small 
isolated economies.  
 
The place and form of desirable competition law in any economy will depend upon the 
existing legal and political institutions of that country as well as more specific factors 
including those of size and location. Application of competition law that does not inhibit 
but enhances dynamic performance is a particular challenge for economies such as New 
Zealand with very small isolated domestic markets because domestic demand - and 
therefore domestic opportunity - is very limited and firms are extremely mobile in the 
modern world. This combination enhances the argument for competition law that enables 
dynamic efficiency and thereby the long term interest of New Zealand consumers.  
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